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A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates
maintain their electoral promises. We drop such assumption and we show that costless
electoral campaign can be an eﬀective way of transmitting information to voters. The result
is robust to relevant equilibrium reﬁnements. An unavoidable proportion of ambiguous
politicians emerges.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D72, P16, C73
Keywords: Information Transmission, Electoral Campaign, Endogenous Commitment.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is commonplace to say that electoral promises cannot be taken at their face
value. However, parties and candidates invest a considerable amount of eﬀort
and resources in producing electoral messages. Presumably, electoral campaign
is believed to be a credible mean to attract voters’ support. But if campaigns
are a mere act of promising why should they inﬂuence citizens?
Intuitively, campaigns convey information useful to predict future policies
and future policies should be predictable from present ones. Otherwise, the elec-
toral process could not accomplish its very objective of selecting and retaining
politicians according to electors’ views. Electoral campaigns, to be meaningful,
must alter electors’ beliefs about the policies the elected oﬃcials will implement.
A widely employed explanation is that politicians and elected oﬃcials seek re-
election. Electoral promises aﬀect voters’ expectations about the policies that
the elected oﬃcials will choose. They provide a benchmark linking promises,
policies and reelection (retrospective voting), because a credible threat to re-
election is imposed (see Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986) and Austen-Smith and
Banks (1989)).
Nevertheless, the disciplining role of electoral competition is only one face
of the coin. I prove here that electoral promises provide also a solution to the
informational asymmetries between candidates and politicians. The diﬃculty
arises because campaigns are “cheap talk” changing electoral messages alone
doe not alter agents’ payoﬀ.
Downs (1957) himself underlies intimate the relationship between preelection
statements and post election behavior. He asserts that it is necessary for rational
voting being meaningful.
Now we try to prove that a party’s ideology must be consis-
tent with either (1) its actions in prior election periods, or (2) its
statements in the preceding campaign (including its ideology), or (3)
both... A party is reliable if its policy statements at the beginning
of an election period-including those in its preëlection campaign-can
be used to make accurate predictions of its behavior... A party is re-
sponsible if its policies in one period are consistent with its actions
(or statements in the preceding period),... (pp. 103-105)... The
absence of reliability means that voters cannot predict the behavior
of parties from what the parties say they will do. The absence of
responsibility means party behavior cannot be predicted by consis-
tently projecting what parties have done previously....We conclude
that reliability is a logical necessity in any rational election system,
and that responsibility-though not logically necessary-is strongly im-
plied by rationality as we deﬁne it. Of course this conclusion does not
prove that reliability and responsibility actually exist in our model.
We can demonstrate that they do-and therefore that our model is
rational-only by showing that political parties are inexorably driven
1by their own motives to be both reliable and responsible...(pp. 105-
107). In our model it is necessary for each party’s ideology to bear
a consistent relation to its actions.... Any other procedure makes
rational voting nearly impossible... (p. 113).
However, most of the classical models of electoral competitions like the
Hotelling-Downs one assume that politicians commit to their electoral engage-
ments. The questions about the credibility of campaign promises are left unan-
swered.
Building on Downs’ intuition, the paper provides an explanation based on
both informational asymmetries and dynamic aspects, in our case career con-
cerns. Each one of the argument alone is not able to provide a satisfactory
solution. Under complete information, politicians cannot credibly commit to
policies diﬀerent from their favorite ones unless elections are inﬁnitely repeated
(Alesina (1988)). The result can be relaxed only allowing for indiﬀerence in vot-
ers’ preferences (Aragonés et al (2005))1. With the prospect of a unique election,
costless electoral campaign cannot be meaningful (Harrington (1992a)) unless
one drops the assumption of full policy enforceability (Harrington (1992b))2.
The paper that is closest to our approach is Harrington (1993). He presents a
model of ﬁnitely (twice) repeated elections under bilateral asymmetric informa-
tion. Elected oﬃcials can choose between two policies. Candidates’ and voters’
types are the policies they think to be the most beneﬁcial to their income. The
type space is ﬁnite and beliefs are not consistent with the common prior assump-
tion. While voters’ only care about their income, candidates’ preferences are
lexicographic: they ﬁrst care about holding the oﬃc ea n dt h e na b o u tt h ep o l i c y
they implement. In this case, each politician prefers to carry out the policy
s h eb e l i e f st h em o s te ﬀective. The author proves that there exist equilibria in
which each candidate truthfully announces and implements her favorite policy.
Policy preferences play only a tie-braking role so there is no interaction between
reelection concerns and policy preferences.
This paper presents a model in which candidates’ care both about oﬃce and
about the policy they implement if elected. Politicians’ and voters’ preferences
are private information. Diﬀerently from Harrington (1993), the type space is
continuous and beliefs are derived from a common prior. The distribution of
agents’ preferences is symmetric with respect to the origin. Candidates’ compete
for election by announcing a particular policy. The campaign announcement is
costless. The winning candidate implements a policy and runs for reelection
against a randomly chosen opponent. The analysis focus on symmetric and
monotonic equilibria in which centrist politicians are elected with higher prob-
abilities and implement more centrist policies. Monotonic equilibria permit to
rule out very unlikely behaviors where extremists present themselves as centrist,
1The authors themselves admit that this approach does not seems a "compelling expla-
nation because of how campaign promises can have eﬀect since it rests on the existence of a
nontrivial set of indiﬀerent voters".
2Costly electoral campaign can be relevant (Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie
(2005)).
2while moderates make an extremist campaign, and have an intuitive appeal.
Furthermore, I show that in all non-monotonic equilibrium electoral campaign
is meaningful. I reﬁne out-of-equilibrium beliefs with regard to totally unex-
pected policies, using a reﬁnement ﬁrst introduced by Bernheim and Severinov
(2003)3.
This reﬁnement is called monotonic D1 Criterion. It adapts the D1 Criterion,
proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987), to monotonic environments. I characterize
the set of these equilibria. Innovating on Harrington (1993), I prove reelection
pressures and policy motivations interact giving relevance to electoral promises.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for informative campaign is a suﬃciently
high candidates’ policy concern. Candidates suﬀer the tension between pleas-
ing their constituencies and seeking ther e e l e c t i o n .T h ec o s to fa m b i g u i t yi st o
implement policies that are faraway from the candidate’s favorite one. So ex-
tremists are less willing to fully pay it. But they do pay a price, even when they
fully reveal their preferences. It is because they are forced to please the centrist
electorate to enhance their election chances. Centrist candidates prefer to pool
on the same electoral campaign to increase their election perspectives. Reliabil-
ity as commitment to the electoral promises of a relevant part of the politicians
emerges endogenously. In the same way responsibility appears, present policies
can be useful proxies to predict future ones. But ambiguous (or dishonest be-
havior cannot be eliminated). There will be always politicians who act as pure
oﬃce seekers4. I show that their share decreases as the degree of policy concern
increases. The ambiguity of centrist politicians captures a feature that Harring-
ton (1993) was not able to account for: the partial (but relevant) responsiveness
of policies to electoral announcements found by empirical work (see Harrington
(1992a) and (1992b)). The result also connects with the debate on the nature of
political center. It is compatible with the vision of a political center lacking of
aw e l l - d e ﬁned ideology and better deﬁned by its opportunistic behavior, which
is popular between the general public (see Hazan (1997)).
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2 I describe agents’
behavior and I introduce the characteristics of electoral competition and the
deﬁnition of an Electoral Equilibrium. In Section 3 I present some preliminary
results that clarify our choices and I prove the impossibility of fully honest be-
havior. Section 4 introduces the equilibrium reﬁnement that I analyze in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusion and suggests possible directions of
future research. An Appendix contains the proofs that are not included in the
main text.
2 The Model
Candidates’ and voters’ preferences are private knowledge. Candidates compete
for oﬃce by making campaign announcements. The winner chooses a policy
taking into account reelection perspectives. There are two elections. The policy
3See also Kartik (2005).
4The result is general, does not depend on the equilibrium reﬁnement used.
3space is P =[ −D,D],w h e r eD>0.T h e r ea r et w ocandidates: R(ight) and
L(eft). Let PR =[ 0 ,D] and PL =[ −D,0] be candidate R and candidate L
policy space, respectively.
Candidates’ policy intentions (their types) are assumed to be independent and
symmetric random variables. Candidate R type, αR ∈ [0,D] is drawn from the
cdf F(·) with continuous density, f(·)=F0(·),w h e r ef(α) > 0 if and only if
α ∈ [0,D].C a n d i d a t eL’s policy intentions have symmetric density.
In the campaign stage each candidate j = L,R can send a message m ∈ Pj.
B a s e do nc a m p a i g na n n o u n c e m e n t s(mR,m L) each voter casts her vote for one
of the candidates. We assume that there are n voters, where n ∈ N is odd
and publicly known. Once in oﬃce, the winning candidate implements a policy
from her policy space, simultaneously a challenger is selected from the original
distribution. Each voter observes incumbent’s policy choice and, casts a vote to
conﬁrm or to ﬁre her. The “world ends” after this election. Challenger’s type
is drawn from the original distribution FL
5.
A voter of type α ∈ [−D,D] has preferences represented by the following utility
function, V (x,α)=−(α−x)2,w h e r ex is the policy implemented by the elected
politician.
At each election, a median voter, mv is drawn, independently across time, from
a symmetric distribution G on [−D,D]. G is assumed to have a continuous
density, g(·)=G0(·). The assumption is equivalent to have a known median
voter in 0 with a symmetric unknown idiosyncratic bias (see Austen-Smith and
Banks (2005)).
Let y>0 candidates’ private beneﬁt derived from holding the oﬃce, let k>0
be their degree of policy implication and let δ ∈ (0,1) be their intertemporal
factor discount. Let x be the policy implemented by the incumbent
Candidate α’s utility from winning the election is, at each period
U(x,α)=y − k(α − x)2.
A defeated candidate gets 0 utility6.
Let πi be the probability candidate R wins the election i,f o ri =1 ,2.W h e n
an incumbent is conﬁrmed in the oﬃce, she will implement her favorite policy.








Let mv be the median voter. Let µ be her beliefs about candidates’ policy
preferences. She votes for candidate R if and only if E
£
(mv − αR)2 | µ
¤
<
5From Harrington (1992a and b) it follows that any campaign stage before the last election
would be irrelevant.
6The results of the paper can be generalized to the case in which candidates care also about
the policy implemented by any incumbent.
4E
£
(mv − αL)2 | µ
¤














E [αR | µ] − E [αL | µ]
is the decisive median voter.
Then R is elected with probability π(µ)=1−G(e(µ)) = 1
2 +G(−e(µ)), because
G is symmetric.
The next example presents the values of decisive median voters for two diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the beliefs, that will be used along the paper.
Example 1
If voters believe that candidate R is of type α>0 and that candidate L is













In this case we denote by π((α,f (·))) R’s probability of election.
Instead, if voters believe that candidate R’s type belongs to interval (α1,α 2)
and it is drawn from the distribution F, while candidate L is randomly drawn















We denote by π((α1,α 2,f(·))) R’s probability of election. Using elementary
Analysis it can be shown that e(α3,f(·)) >e ([α1,α 2],f(·)) >e (α0,f(·)) if
α3 >α 2 >α 1 >α 0 > 0. e(α,f (·)) is strictly increasing in α. e([α1,α 2],f(·))
is strictly decreasing in α1,α 2 (separately).
Finally, limα1→α
−
2 e([α1,α 2],f(·)) = e(α2,f(·)) and
limα2→α
+
1 e([α1,α 2],f(·)) = e(α1,f(·)).
2.2 The Electoral Equilibrium
A campaign strategy for candidate j = R,L is a function mj : Pj → Pj. j’s
campaign strategy is a costless announcement of a policy by candidate j.
If elected, candidate j has to choose a policy Pj.Apolicy strategy for incum-
bent j is a function sj : P2
j × Pk → Pj, j 6= k.
Remark 1 Each incumbent is opposed to a randomly chosen challenger, then
there is no loss of generality in considering policy strategies that are independent
from the other candidate’s campaign message. We consider policy strategies
that depend only on incumbent’s type and from the electoral message she sent,
5which is policy of the form sj : P2
j → Pj.W i t hsR(α,m) we denote the policy
implemented a right wing incumbent of type α, who had sent an electoral message
m. Analogous notation is used for candidate L.










represents the probability the median voter votes for candidate j at the ﬁrst
election, when she is of type γ and has observed electoral messages (mR,mL).I fj
results elected after campaign messages (mR,mL), r2j(mR,mL,s j,γ) denote the
probability that the median voter of type γ votes for her, when she implements
policy sj.
Remark 2 Like in Remark 1, there is no loss of generality in considering sec-
ond stage voting strategies independent of ﬁrst stage loser’s campaign, Then, we
consider voting strategies that depend only on incumbent electoral message, on
the policy she implemented and on median voter’s type, which is r2j : P2




,f o rj = R,L.
A belief at the ﬁrst election about candidates is a function µ1 from the
cartesian product of campaign messages PL ×PR to the set of joint probability
distributions on P2. A belief at the second election is a function µ2 from the
cartesian product of campaign messages, ﬁrst stage voting outcomes, and policy
outcomes to the set of joint probability distributions on P2.
Deﬁnition 1 An electoral equilibrium consists of strategies (mR,s R), (r1R,r 2R),
(mL,s L), (r1L,r 2L) and beliefs (µ1,µ 2) such that














(2) For all (α,m) ∈ [0,D] × [0,D], sR(α,m) maximizes in s ∈ [0,D]:




Analogous requirement are imposed on candidate L’s strategies
(3) For all (mR,m L,γ) ∈ [0,D] × [−D,0] × [−D,D]:
r1R(mR,m L,γ)=1 if E
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(γ − sL(·))2 | µ1(mR,m L)
¤
.
Expectations are taken with respect to µ1.
Analogous requirements are imposed on candidate L’s ﬁrst term probability of
election.
(4) For all (m,s,γ) ∈ [0,D] × [0,D] × [−D,D]:
r2R(m,s,γ)=1if E
£























(γ − αL)2 | µ2(mR,s)
¤
.
Expectations are taken with respect to µ2.
Analogous requirement are imposed on candidate L’s second term probability of
election
(5) Beliefs are computed using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Conditions (1) and (2) say that each candidate’s electoral and policy strate-
gies are sequentially optimal given her opponent’s strategies and voters’ decision.
Conditions (3) and (4) say that voters’ decisions are optimal at each election,
given their beliefs.
Deﬁnition 2 An electoral equilibrium {(mj,s j),(r1j,r 2j),(µ1,µ 2)}j=R,L
is symmetric if (mR(α),s R((α),m R(α))) = −(mL(−α),s L((−α),m L(−α)))












π1R and π2R are candidate R’s probabilities of winning the ﬁrst and the
second election, respectively.
Deﬁne analogous quantities for candidate L.
Deﬁnition 3 An electoral equilibrium {(mj,s j),(r1j,r 2j),(µ1,µ 2)}j=R,L
is monotonic if:
(R) π1R(mR(α),m L(·)) and π2R(mR(α),s R (α)) a r ed e c r e a s i n go n[0,D],a n d
sR (α,mR (α)) is increasing on [0,D]7.
(L) π1L(mR(·),m L(α)) and π2L(mL(α),s L (α)) are increasing on [−D,0] and
sL (α,mL (α)) is decreasing on [−D,0].
7Unless otherwise stated, decreasing and increasing will stay for weakly decreasing and
weakly increasing, respectively.
7In words, an electoral equilibrium is monotonic if centrist candidates have
higher probabilities of being elected, and implement more centrist policies.
Let {(mj,s j),(r1j,r 2j),(µ1,µ 2)}j=R,L be an electoral equilibrium.
Let x ∈ [0,D] and set Ω(x)={α : mR(α)=x}. Ω(x) is called an electoral
pool.
Let x,z ∈ [0,D] and set Ω(x,z)={α : sR(α,x)=z}. Ω(mR(α),s R(α,mR(α)))
is called a policy pool.
Let x,α,α0 ∈ [0,D], α 6= α0.I fΩ(mR(α)) = {α} or Ω(mR(α),s R(α,mR(α))) =
{α} we say that α separates in campaign or in policy, respectively. Other-
wise, we say that α pool.I f{α,α0} ⊂ Ω(mR(α)) or if {α,α0} ⊂ Ω(mR(α),s R(α,mR(α)))
we say that α and α0 pool (together) in campaign or in policy, respectively. If
Ω(mR(α)) = {α} and Ω(mR(α),s R(α,mR(α))) = {α} for all α ∈ [0,D],t h e n
the equilibrium is fully separating. If only one of the two conditions holds,
then the equilibrium will be said separating in campaign and in policy,
respectively.
Analogous deﬁnitions hold for candidate L. All along the paper, we devote our
attention to symmetric monotonic equilibria. Then, in the analysis, it suﬃces to
consider only one of the two candidates. We will analyze R’s strategies omitting
the subscript R, when there is no risk of ambiguity. Furthermore we use s(α)
for s(m(α),α), π1(α) for π1(mR(α),m L(·)) and π2(α) for π2(m(α),s(α)).
The following Remark points out the connectivity properties of monotone equi-
libria.
Remark 3 Let {(mj,s j),(r1j,r 2j),(µ1,µ 2)}j=R,L be a monotonic equilibrium.
(1) For each α ∈ [0,D], Ω(m(α),s(α)) is connected, hence it is an interval.
(2) If s(α)=s(α0) then π1(α)=π1(α0) and π2(α)=π2(α0).
There is no loss of generality in assuming that candidates having the same prob-
ability of election at the ﬁrst stage use the same electoral campaign (we assume
candidates only use pure strategies). Under this assumption, we can state (2)
as.
(3) s(α)=s(α0) ⇒ m(α)=m(α0).
Monotonicity has a very intuitive appeal and helps to get rid of unlikely
equilibria, for example of situations in which centrists and moderates present
diﬀerent electoral platforms, but extremists pool with centrists.
We say that the electoral campaign is meaningful if there exist α, α0 ∈ [0,D],
such that π1(α) 6= π1(α0).
3 Preliminary results on monotonic equilibria
The ﬁrst result provides an additional reason that makes monotonic equilibrium
a reasonable choice in this environment. Any electoral equilibrium is, locally,
monotonic. In all electoral pools, equilibrium policies are monotonic and second
stage election probabilities are decreasing.
8Lemma 1 Let x ∈ [0,D] be a campaign message. In all symmetric equilibria:
(i) s(α,x),i si n c r e a s i n gi nα on Ω(x).
(ii) π2(x,s(α,x)) is decreasing in α on Ω(x)8.
Symmetric claims hold for candidate L.
From Lemma 1, it follows:
Corollary 1 In any non monotonic equilibrium the electoral campaign is mean-
ingful.
In any monotonic equilibrium, if the types (α1,α 2) belong to the same policy
pool, then there is a set of unused policies. This result will be frequently used.
It implies that the policy function has a discontinuity, at the end of any policy
pool.
Lemma 2 Let x ∈ [0,D] be a policy and let α1 <α 2.I f s(α)=x for all
α ∈ (α1,α 2), then there exists h>0 such that policies in (x,x + h) are not used
or s(α)=x on (α2,D].
The next result shows that the threat of reelection is eﬀective on the incum-
bent. In order not to decrease her chances of reelection, she will implement a
policy which is more centrist than her favorite one.
Lemma 3 In a monotonic equilibrium, if s(α) is separating on [α1,α 2) then
s(α) <αon [α1,α 2).
It follows that in any monotonic equilibrium some candidates’ types are
pooling in order to increase the probability of winning the elections. This fact
implies that a full separating equilibrium does not exist.
Proposition 4 There exists no policy separating monotonic equilibrium. Hence
there is no full separating equilibrium.
Proof. Otherwise, from Lemma 3 s(0) < 0. Any full separating equilibrium is
equivalent to a monotonic equilibrium so the second claim follows from the ﬁrst
one.
4T h e M D 1 r e ﬁnement
In this section, we present an equilibrium reﬁnement, introduced by Bernheim
and Severinov (2003) and studied also in Kartik (2005) for one round signalling
games in which costless and costly messages are present. Diﬀerently from Kar-
tik (2005) in our model there are two senders and receiver’s type is unknown.
Furthermore, cheap talk and costly signalling are not simultaneous. We then
8Property (i) holds in any electoral equilibrium, either symmetric or asymmetric.
9adapt the reﬁnement to our framework. We apply it only to policies that are
never used in equilibrium.
Before the Monotonic D1 criterion is deﬁned, we introduce some notation. We
will refer to the lower and highest probability of election, following a given pol-
icy x. For all x ∈ [0,D] set
πlR(x)= s u p
sR(α)>x
π2R(α) if sR (α) >x for some α ∈ [0,D]
πlR(x)=π2R(D,f(·)) otherwise
and
πhR(x)= i n f
sR(α)<x
π2R(α),i fsR (α) <xfor some α ∈ [0,D]
πhR(x)=π(0,f(·)) otherwise
Analogous bounds are symmetrically deﬁned for candidate L.
Deﬁnition 4 An electoral equilibrium satisﬁes the monotonic D1 (MD1)
criterion if
(1) It is monotonic








L) ∈ PR × PL.L e tx ∈ [0,D]
with µ(x | βR,βL)=0for all (βR,βL) ∈ PR × PL. Assume that there exists a
non-empty set of types Ω ⊂ [0,D] such that, for each α/ ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s t ss o m e
α0 ∈ Ω such that for all π ∈ [πlR(x),πhR(x)]:
π1R(β)
¡




y − k(sR(α) − α)2 + π2(α)δy
¢
=⇒
π1R(β)(y − k(x − α0)2 + πδy) >π 1R(α0)
¡
y − k(sR(α0) − α0)2 + π2(α0)δy
¢
then µ(·,·|m,x)=µR(·)f(·) and suppµR (·|m,x)) ⊂ Ω.
Analogous requirement is symmetrically imposed on candidate L.
In the case in which [πlR(x),πhR(x)] is substituted by [π(D,f(·)),π(0,f(·))]
w ew o u l dh a v ea na d a p t a t i o nt oo u rs e t u po ft h eD 1c r i t e r i o ni n t r o d u c e db y
Cho and Kreps (1987). (2) extends the monotonicity requirements to out of
equilibrium beliefs. If an elected oﬃcial implements out of equilibrium policy
x, she should expect of being reelected with probability between πlR (x) and
πhR (x).T h e r e ﬁnement assign positive probability only to those types who
beneﬁt most from this deviation. From now on, we will refer to MD1 equilibria
only, if not otherwise stated.
5 Equilibrium characterization and existence
If s(·) is increasing then it has at most a countable set of discontinuity points
and it is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere (see Royden (1988)). There is no loss
of generality in assuming that the electoral campaign is monotonic increasing
and that m(α)=α when type α is separating, and that agents having the same
probability of being elected at the ﬁrst election make the same announcement.
10Denote by α1,α 2,...αk,... where 0 ≤ α1 <α 2 <. . .<α k < ... ≤ D the
discontinuity points of s.
Lemma 4 Assume that, for some i =1 ,2,...,k,...,t h et y p e si n(αi,α i+1) belong
the same policy pool. Then they belong to the same campaign pool.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ α<α 0 <α 00. By contradiction, assume that some types in
(α,α0) ⊂ (αi,α i+1) send message m and that the types in (α0,α 00) ⊂ (αi,α i+1)
send message m0.L e tα0 +ε imitate type α0 −ε. The gain in the probability of
being elected at the ﬁrst stage is bounded below by a strictly positive constant.
The gain in second election probability is non negative. For ε → 0 the loss in
policy term goes to 0 by continuity, so the deviation would be proﬁtable for ε
small enough.
Observe that α =a r gm a x α0 π1(α0))
h
y − k(s(α0) − α)






y − k(s(α) − α)









2 (α)δy]=0on (α0,α 00) (2)
Remark 5 If π1 and π2 are C1 and strictly decreasing both problems deﬁned
by the diﬀerential equations above and the terminal condition S(D)=D have
a unique solution such that s(α) <αon (D − ε,D), for arbitrary small ε>0.
The result follows from Lemma 5 in the Appendix (see also Kartik (2005)). Such
solution is such that s(α) <αon (0,D). Furthermore s(0) < 0. Otherwise the
graph of s should crosses the diagonal at some α∗ > 0.I nt h i sc a s elimα→α∗+
s0(α)=∞. This is impossible: if the graph cross the diagonal it must be from
below because s(α) <αon (0,D).
For all α,α0 such that m(α)=m(α0),s e t
T(α,β,x,π2)=π1(β)
¡




y − k(s(α) − α)2 + π2 (α)δy
¢
.
Remark 6 Condition (2) of Deﬁnition 4 can be written in this case as




L)) and let x ∈ [0,D] with µ(x | βR,βL)=0for all
(βR,βL) ∈ PR×PL. If there exists a non-empty set of types Ω ⊂ [0,D] such that,
for each α/ ∈ Ω,i ft h e r ee x i s t ss o m eα0 ∈ Ω such that, for all π ∈ [πl(x),πh(x)]
T(α,β,x,π2) ≥ 0= ⇒ T(α0,β,x,π2) > 0,
then µ(·,·|m,x)=µR(·)f(·),w h e r esuppµR (·|m,x)) ⊂ Ω.
11When there is no risk of ambiguity we omit the arguments β,x,π2 and we
write simply T (α) for T(α,β,x,π2) and T0 (α) for ∂T
∂α(α,β,x,π2).
From Equation 1 it follows that
T 0 (α)=2 k[π1(α)(α − s(α)) − π1(β)(α − x)].( 3 )
Any MD1 equilibrium is characterized by a cutoﬀ type that divides pooling
types from separating types.
Proposition 7 Any symmetric MD1 is essentially equivalent9 to an equilibrium
in which, for all i,t h e r ee x i s t sα∗ ∈ (0,D] such that
(i) sR(α)=0on [0,α ∗]
(ii) If α∗ <Dthen sR(α) is separating on (α∗,D] and sR(D)=D.
We can go further and characterize all MD1 equilibria. According to Propo-
sition 7 they can belong to four categories:
(i) Babbling: equilibria in which all types pool in campaign and policy.
(ii) Campaign irrelevant but policy signiﬁcative equilibria, in which all
types send the same electoral message, but the more extremist types separate
in policy.
(iii) Weakly expressive campaign equilibria in which centrists and extrem-
ists form diﬀerent campaign pools but extremists separate in policy
(iv) Expressive campaign equilibria where centrists pool on the same elec-
toral promise and on the same policy and extremists separate both in campaign
and in policy.
The larger is the degree in which candidates cares about the policy they
implement, the larger are the possibilities of relevant electoral campaign.
Theorem 8 A symmetric MD1 equilibrium exists. There exist k0 <k 1 <k 2
and there exists strictly decreasing functions α1 (k),α 2 (k),α 3(k) with
limk→∞ αi(k)=0for i =1 ,2,3, such that
(i) For k ≤ k0 all MD1 equilibria are fully pooling, which is m(α)=m(0) and
s(α)=0for all α ∈ [0,D].I fk>k 0 such equilibria are not MD1.
(ii) For k ≥ k0 there exists an MD1 equilibria such that m(α)=m(0) for all
α ∈ [0,D], s(α)=0for all α ∈ [0,α 1(k)], s(α) is separating on (α(k),D].
(iii) For k ≥ k1 there exists an MD1 equilibrium in which m(α)=m(0) for all
α ∈ [0,α 2(k)) and m(α)=m(α2(k)) 6= m(0) for all α ∈ [α2(k),D], s(α)=0
for all α ∈ [0,α 2(k)] and s(α) is separating on [α2(k),D].
(iv) For k ≥ k2 there exists an MD1 equilibrium in which m(α)=m(0) for
all α ∈ [0,α 3(k)) and m(α)=α for all α ∈ [α3(k),D]. s(α)=0for all
α ∈ [0,α 2(k)] and s(α) is separating on [α3(k),D].
Any symmetric MD1 equilibrium is essentially equivalent to one of the equilibria
described above.
9Essentially equivalent means that it is equal, excepted, at most a zero measure set of
types.
12Observe that the expressive campaign equilibrium of point (iv) asymptoti-
cally converges to a fully separating equilibrium, in which electoral promises are
maintained.
Theorem 8 relies on the possibilities of threatening the reelection perspectives
of the incumbent, if she shirks. It requires beliefs to be correlated outside of the
equilibrium path.
In the real world electoral disappointment does have an eﬀect on electors. The
model we presented does not capture this aspect because the idiosyncratic shocks
deﬁning median voter exact position is independent across periods and uncorre-
lated to actions. Electoral disappointment can be introduced as a shift of voters
distribution, correlated with the degree of electoral fulﬁllment. To make things
simple as possible assume that median voter distribution is shifted to left in the
case of an R incumbent, or to the right in the case of an L incumbent of a ﬁx
factor x>0,i ft h ee l e c t e do ﬃcer deviates from the expected policy(ies)10.T h e
reader can easily verify that the claim of Theorem 8 holds even if we impose
voters’ beliefs about the two candidates to be independent. More precisely, if






0 βf(β)dβ the k0,k 1,k 2 found in the proof of the result would
stay the same. Otherwise their value would be larger as it would harder to
induce extremists not to pool in campaign. We conjecture that a similar result
can be obtained also through a shock which is continuously dependent from the
distance between expected policy and implemented one.
The MD1 reﬁnement applies only to zero probabilities policies. It is strong
enough to shrink dramatically the set of possible equilibria. The key, as for
Universal Divinity, is that we ask the support of the distribution to be minimal.
If the function T has a a unique maximizer, α, then to such maximizer must be
given probability one. Like in Banks (1990), this leads to equilibria characterized
by a unique cutoﬀ type.
The claim of Proposition 4 relies on the boundedness of the type space.
Allowing for an unbounded type space can lead to full separation in sender-
receiver games with both costly messages and cheap talk (see Kartik (2005)).
It is not the case here. We would obtain full separation in policy, but total
pooling in campaign. The reason is that, asymptotically, candidates utilities
is null, so it is the eﬀect of career concerns. Very extremist candidates would
be incomparably better oﬀ by maximizing their ﬁrst election probability. Full
separation could probably be obtained in the case in which candidates care also
about challengers’ implemented policy.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper has presented a model of electoral competition under incomplete
information in which candidates care about both oﬃce and the policy. It in-
troduces incomplete information and the dynamic aspects of a double election
and it proves that electoral campaign is able to convey relevant information to
10Excluding the case of a totally out of equilibrium policy, which deﬁnes the MD1 criterion.
13voters even when campaigning is not costly. The work opens a possibility for en-
dogenous commitment. The result is driven by both candidates’ career concern
and the threat of failed reelection. The impossibility for candidates to sustain
policies that are too faraway from their ideal ones shapes then policy they carry
out in the ﬁrst term. Extending Harrington (1993), I ﬁnd that not only reelec-
tion pressure but also policy motivation can give relevance to electoral promises.
Despite of it centrists’ electoral opportunism cannot be eliminated. It can be
only be reduced if candidates’ degree of policy implication is high enough. This
is consistent with the empirical literature which estimates that only a part (even
if relevant) of policies are responsive to electoral compromises.
The investigation can be extended in diﬀerent directions. On the one hand
toward the study of more complex models of competition. In our model the
" world ends" after the second election. So just before there is no place for
meaningful electoral competition before the last election. Allowing for repeated
interactions should make it relevant. A suitable and realistic model would be
the one of an overlapping generation of politicians that can stay in the oﬃce for
a ﬁxed number of terms. The threat to reelection imposed on the incumbent
would be reinforced, and so the degree of commitment.
On the other hand, a partially unexplored ﬁeld is the nature itself of electoral
campaign. It is usually modeled as a one-shot policy announcements (either
costly or cheap). Despite of it, in the real world, electoral campaigns are com-
plex and longer interactions between electors and politicians. Voters are contin-
uously exposed to announcements. Politicians invest many resources in pools
to discover electors’ intentions and tastes. The empirical literature considered
these aspects as an important part of the process of information transmission
((see for instance Alvarez (1998)). Parties try both to send reliable messages
and to get information about electors. There is little theoretical investigation
about such phenomena, but the models of repeated cheap talk (see Krishna and
Morgan (2004)) could provide useful tools to deal with the topic.
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168A p p e n d i x
8.1 Section 3
P r o o fo fL e m m a1Let 0 ≤ α<α 0.S e t t = s(α,x), t0 = s(α0,x), π =
π2(x,s(α,x)) and π0 = π0
2(x,s(α0,x)).
(i) The proof of the claim is by contradiction. Assume that t0 <t .F r o m
incentive compatibility it follows:
−k(t − α)2 + πδy ≥− k(t0 − α)2 + π0δy.
−k(t − α0)2 + π0δy ≥− k(t − α0)2 + πδy.
Which is:
(π − π0)δy + k
£
(t0 − α)2 − (t − α)2¤
≥ 0.
(π0 − π)δy + k
£
(t − α0)2 − (t0 − α0)02¤
≥ 0.
Summing up the two inequalities:
(t0 − α)2 − (t − α)2 +( t − α0)2 − (t0 − α0) ≥ 0.
Simplifying:
(α − α0)(t − t0) ≥ 0
that yields a contradiction because α<α 0.
(ii) The proof of the claim is by contradiction. Assume that π>π 0.
From (i) and from the deﬁnition of monotonic equilibrium it follows that
it cannot be the case that α and α0 belong to diﬀerent policy pools or that
α and α0 belong the same policy pool or that α0 pools with some other
type while α separate. It must be the case that α pools and α0 separates.
From Remark 3, the pool α b e l o n g st oi sa ni n t e r v a l(α1,α 2) (or [α1,α 2],











α1 βf (β)dβ +( F(α2) − F(α1))
R D
0 βf (β)dβ













which yields a contradiction.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2From Remark 3, part (3) m(α) constant on (α1,α 2).T h e r e
is no loss of generality in assuming that (α1,α 2) is the interior of the cor-
responding policy pool. From monotonicity s(α2) ≥ x.
Consider ﬁrst the case s(α2) >x . Then policies in (x,s(α2)) are not used
17in equilibrium.
Now let s(α2)=x and set b x = lim α&α2s(α)=i n fα>α2s(α).O b s e r v e
that s(α) >xfor α>α 2. By contradiction, suppose that b x = x.S e t
π1ε = π1(α2 + ε), π1 = π10, π2ε = π2(α2 + ε), π2 = π20. I tm u s tb e
t h ec a s et h a tπ2ε <π 2 and 0 <π 1ε ≤ π1 for all ε>0. The diﬀerence
π2 − π2ε is bounded below by some positive constant c.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
(s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε))
2 > (x − α2 − ε)
2 for all ε>0 Otherwise, α2 + ε
could proﬁtably deviate by mimicking α2.
For all 0 <ε<ε ∗ set
L(ε)=π1
³






y − k[s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε)]
2 + π2εδy
o
L(ε) is the net loss or the net gain to type α2 +ε from imitating type α2.
As it is an equilibrium L(ε) ≤ 0 for all ε>0.
L(ε) ≥ π1k
h
(s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε))






(s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε))






(s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε))
2 − (x − α2 − ε)
2
i
=0 ,t h e nf o rε small
enough L(ε) > 0, a contradiction.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3By contradiction, suppose that s(b α)=b α for some b α ∈
(α1,α 2).L e tε ≥ 0 and set π1ε = π1 (b α + ε,), π1 = π10, π2ε = π2R (b α + ε)
π2 = π20.A ss is strictly increasing π2ε <π 2 and π1ε ≤ π1for all ε>0.
Let L(ε) be the net loss or the net gain to type b α+ε from imitating type
b α. At equilibrium L(ε) ≤ 0 for all ε>0.
L(ε)=π1
¡









y − kε2 + π2δy
¢
−π1ε {y + π2εδy} ≥ π1ε∗
£
−kε2 +( π2 − π2ε)δy
¤
,
for some ﬁxed ε∗ > 0. π1ε∗ > 0 and π2ε = π(b α + ε,f(·)).
Set B(ε)=π1ε∗
£
















> 0 from Example 1.
As B(0) = 0,t h e nB(ε) > 0 for ε small enough. But then type b α+ε could
proﬁtably mimic type b α,f o rε small enough, yielding a contradiction.
By contradiction, assume that s(α) >α .C o n s i d e r t y p e α0 = s(α) >α .
By monotonicity s(α0) >s (α) because agents in [α1,α 2) separate. But
then α0 could proﬁtably imitate α: the probabilities of election at both
stages increase and she would not pay policy costs.
8.2 Section 5
Lemma 5 Let f be a strictly negative C1 functions deﬁned on [0,D]×B where
B i sar e a li n t e r v a ls u c ht h a t[0,D] $ B ⊂ (−∞,D]. Then there exists a solu-




y0 (x)(y − x)=f (x,y (x))
y(D)=D
y(x) ≤ x
Furthermore, if there exists δ>0 such that fy (x,y) ≥ 0 for every (x,y) ∈
{(x,y) ∈ B : ||(x,y) − (D,D)|| <δ , y<x ,}, then the solution is unique.
Proof. The problem does not satisfy the local Lipschitz conditions in a neigh-
borhood of D. The existence part of the Proof is by approximation. Let yε be
the solution of the following Cauchy problem:
½
y0 (x)(y(x) − x)=f (x,y (x))
y(D)=D − ε
Here the local existence and uniqueness theorem applies. In order to prove that
yε(x) c a nb ee x t e n d e dt ot h ei n t e r v a l[0,D] it suﬃces to show that there exists
no x∗ ∈ [0,D), such that limx→x∗+ y0
ε(x)=∞. In this case the extension the-
orem applies. First observe that if yε is deﬁned and C1in the interval (x∗,D].
From yε(D)=D − ε and y0
ε (x)(yε (x) − x) < 0 it follows that y0
ε (x) > 0
and yε (x) <xon (x∗,D].I f limx→x∗+ y0
ε(x)=∞,t h e nlimx→x∗+ yε(x)=
x∗. It follows that, for δ>0 small enough, y0
ε (x) > 2 on (x∗,x ∗ + δ].L e t
0 <δ
0
































0 → 0.F r o m
the previous observations it follows that the RHS converges to 2δ while the LHS
is independent of δ
0 <δ .T h e n yε (x∗ + δ) − (x∗ + δ) > 2δ>0,w h i c hy i e l d s
a contradiction. yε (x) is C1 with respect to ε on [0,D) (Pontryagin (1962),
ch. 23). yε (D) → D for ε → 0. By contradiction, assume that, for some
x ∈ [0,D), yε(x) is not converging for ε → 0. In particular, for some 0 <δ<D ,
the Ascoli-Arzelá Theorem does not apply in [0,D− δ].T h e f a m i l y {yε}ε>0
is uniformly bounded in [0,D− δ] (because yε(x) ≤ x on [0,D− δ]).I t m u s t
be the case that {yε}ε>0 it is not uniformly continuous then supε>0 y0
ε = ∞.
As above, it follows that yε (x) >xfor some ε and some x ∈ [0,D− δ],a
contradiction. So yε converges uniformly to some y in each interval [0,D− δ].
Each yε satisﬁes y0 (x)(y(x) − x)=f (x,y (x)),a n dy0
ε converges uniformly to
some continuous z.T h e ny0 = z. The local existence and uniqueness theorem
implies that y is independent of the choice of δ.T h ef u n c t i o ny is deﬁned and
diﬀerentiable on [0,D) and satisﬁes y0 (x)(y(x) − x)=f (x,y) because each yε
satisﬁes it. y(x) <xon [0,D) otherwise y0 (x) →∞for x → x∗,s o m ex∗
against the uniform convergence of y0
ε. The existence part is proved by setting
y(D)=l i m x→D y(x)=0 .
Now we prove uniqueness. Let f such that that, for some δ>0, fy (x,y) ≥ 0 for
every (x,y) ∈ {(x,y) ∈ B : ||(x,y) − (D,D)|| <δ , y<x ,}. By contradiction,
assume that y1 and y2 two diﬀerent solutions of the problem. The local exis-
tence and uniqueness theorem implies that the graphs of the function cross only
at (D,D). There is no loss of generality then in assuming that y1 (x) <y 2 (x) on
19[0,D). Then, for some δ small enough y0
1 (x) >y 0
2 (x) for all x ∈ [D − δ,D).F o r
x next to D,w eh a v ey0
2 (x)(y2 (x) − x) ≥ y0
1 (x)(y1 (x) − x)=f (x,y1 (x)) ≥
f (x,y2 (x)) with at least one strict inequality. This yields a contradiction be-
cause y2 solves the ODE problem.
From Lemma 2 follows that if some types (α0,α 00) ⊂ (αi,α i+1) are in the
same policy pool then (αi,α i+1) is included in the same policy pool. So if (αi,α)
with α ≤ αi+1 are separating then types in (αi,α i+1) are all separating.
Lemma 6 In a symmetric MD1 equilibrium
(i) s(0) = 0
(ii) If types in (αi,α i+1) are in the same policy pool then agents in (αi+1,α i+2)
separate.
(iii) If types in (αi,α 1+1) separate then αi+1 = D
(iv) s(D)=D
Proof. For i =1 ,...,.S e t si = limα%αi s(α) and set si = limα&αi s(α).
Set s0 =0 , s0 = s(0) sD =l i m α%D s(α) and set sD = s(D) ≤ D.B y
deﬁnition si < si for i =1 ,2.... and s0 ≤ s0, sD ≤ sD. From equilibrium




T1 (α,β,x,π) < 0
if α>α i and T1 (α,β,x,π) > 0 for α<α i. Then from Condition (2) µ(αi |














∪ (sD,D), µ(D | m(β),x)=1 .
(i) By contradiction, suppose that s(0) > 0. From the result above, for ε small
enough µ(0 | m(0),ε)=1 .T h e nε can proﬁtably deviate by sending (m(0),ε).
(ii) Let s∗ = s(α) for all α ∈ (αi,α i+1). If agents in (αi+1,α i+2) are pooling
then, for ε small enough αi+1+ε can proﬁtably deviate by implementing policy
si − δ,w i t hδ small enough µ(αi+1 | m(αi+1 + ε),si − δ)=1 .I t i s b e c a u s e ,
from the continuity of x on (αi+1,α i+2), the gain in second election probability
is bounded below by a positive constant, while loss in policy term is of order δ
2.
(iii) If types in (αi,α i+1) are separating and types in (αi+1,α i+2) are pool-
ing then type αi+1 + ε can proﬁtably deviate by sending (m(αi+1 − ε),si − δ).
µ(αi+1 | (m(αi+1 − ε),si − δ)) = 1.F o rδ small enough, the loss in policy term
is compensated by the gain in election probability. If types in (α,αi+1) are pool-
ing then, for ε small enough αi+1 + ε can proﬁtably deviate by implementing
policy si − δ,w i t hδ small enough. µ(αi+1 | m(αi+1 + ε),si − δ)=1The loss
in policy term is of order δ
2, the gain in second election probability is bounded
below by a positive constant.
(iv) If s(D) <D ,f o r,µ(D | m(D),D)=1 ,b e c a u s ef o ra l lx ∈ (s(D),D) the
function T has a maximum between x and D.T h e nD can proﬁtably deviate
by implementing policy D − ε,w i t hε<D− s(D).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7It suﬃces to show that α∗ > 0. By contradiction,
assume that α∗ =0 . In this the equilibrium would have a monotonic
electoral equilibrium with separating policies contradicting Proposition 4.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m8We will always assume that, whenever beliefs are not
imposed by Bayesian, consistency or by the MD1 reﬁnement, if a candidate
20announces a policy and implements a diﬀerent one, then the median voter
will not conﬁrm her. This is consistent as we allow beliefs to be correlated.
Let us consider the diﬀerent possibilities.
(a) The ﬁrst case is α∗ = D so that the equilibrium is equivalent to an
equilibrium in which all types are pooling together at 0 aa n da tb o t h
stages they are elected with probability 1
2, and after the ﬁrst election all







.T h i si sa n










δyπ2 (D),o t h e r w i s et y p eD could proﬁtably separate by implementing
policy D (at the campaign and at the policy stage respectively 11)w h i c h

















where π2 (D) is the probability a candidate is elected at the second stage

















2, because of the sym-
metry of G.F o rk<k 0 a (continuous of) pooling equilibrium exists but
it does not satisﬁes the MD1 criterion.
(b) The second case is that α∗ <D , and all types pool at the ﬁrst stage.
In such a case all types are elected with probability 1
2 at the ﬁrst election.
At the second stage type α ∈ [0,α ∗] is elected with probability:

















e([0,α ∗],f(·)) is the decisive voter when the types in [0,α ∗] are pool-
ing and matched to a challenger selected from the original distribution.
Elementary analysis shows that −D<e([0,α ∗],f(·)) <Dfor α∗ > 0 and







0 βf(β)dβ ∈ [−D,0]. limα∗→D− e([0,α ∗],f(·)) = 0.S o π2 (α) is
strictly decreasing and diﬀerentiable in α.
At y p eα ∈ (α∗,D] is elected at the second stage with probability:













11See the proof of Proposition 7 above.
21We have −D<e([0,α ∗],f(·)) <e(α,f (·)) <D .S oπ2 (α) <π 2 ([0,α ∗])








0 βf(β)dβ ∈ (0,D).S o π2 (α) is strictly decreasing and continu-
ously diﬀerentiable in α∗.
If s(α) is separating on (α∗,D],i tm u s ts a t i s f y :
2ks0(α))(s(α) − α)=π0
2 (α)δy
with the ﬁnal condition s(D)=D.F u r t h e r m o r e ,α∗ = α1(k) > 0 must be




+ δπ2 ([0,α ∗])
¶










2 + δπ2 ([0,α])
¢
y − kα2 −
¡1
2 + π2 (α)δ
¢
y + k(s(α) − α)
2.
s(0) < 0.S o H(0) > 0. H (D)=[ π2 ([0,D]) − π2 (D)]δy − kD2 = £1
2 − π2 (D)
¤
δy−kD2 ≤ 0 if k ≥ k0. H0 (α) < 0=
dπ2([0,α])
dα δy−2ks(α) <















s2 (α1(k)) − 2α1(k)s(α1(k))
dπ2([0,α1(k)])
dα δy − 2ks(α1(k))
< 0.
Then α1(k) is strictly decreasing in k.
From H(α1(k)) = 0 follows α1(k) → 0 as k →∞ .
(c) In the third case there are two campaign pools [0,α ∗) and(α∗,D],w i t h
the second separating in policies. [0,α ∗) types’ election probabilities are
π1 ([0,α ∗]) =
1
2
F(α∗)+( 1− F(α∗))[1 − G(e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D]))].
and π2 ([0,α ∗)), respectively, where (e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D])) is the decisive




































12Because s solves the diﬀerential equation.
22Observe that G(e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D])) ≤ 1
2, because e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D]) ≤ 0.
(α∗,D]’s election probabilities are:






















From the symmetry of the distribution G, G(e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D])) = 1 −
G(e((α∗,D],[0,α ∗))) = 1 − G ≤ 1
2.s o :




and π1 ([0,α ∗]) = π1 ((α∗,D])+ 1
2 −G(e((α∗,D],[0,α ∗))) ≥ π1 ((α∗,D]).
As above, on (α∗,D] s must satisfy:
2ks0(α))(s(α) − α)=π0
2 (α)δy
and α∗ must satisfy:
π1 [0,α ∗]
£













(π1 ((α∗,D]) + π2 (α∗)δ)y − k(s(α∗) − α∗)
2o
As above, it can be shown, that a unique solution to H(α2(k),k)=0
exists if and only if H(D) > 0 which is if and only if k ≥ k∗
1 >k 0 where
H(D,k∗
1)=0 . α2(k) is strictly decreasing and α2(k) → 0 as k →∞ .
It must be checked that type D does not want to imitate type α2(k) in
the campaign and then implement D,w h i c hi s
π1 [0,α 2(k)]y ≤ π1 ((α2(k),D])[(1 + π2 (D))δy], or, equivalently 1
2 −G−










(1 + F (α2(k))π2 (D)δ) ≤
π2(D)δ
2 .




(1 + F (α)π2 (D)δ)−
π2(D)δ
2 . R(0) = −
π2(D)δ
2 < 0, R0 > 0.A s α2(k) & 0 as k →∞ ,t h e r e
exists a unique k∗ > 0 such that this kind of equilibrium exists only for
k ≥ k∗.S e tk1 =m a x{k∗,k∗
1}.
(d) The last possible case is that agents in [0,α ∗] pool in campaign and
policy, and agents in (α,D] separate in campaign and in message. Then







[1 − G(e([0,α ∗],β))]f (β)dβ






2f (β)dβ − F(α∗)α2
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ + F(α∗)α
.
e([0,α ∗],α) < 0 as α>α ∗.S oG(e([0,α ∗],α)) < 1
2.
If α∗ <α<Dthen is separating in campaign D is elected with probabil-
ity:






















2f (β)dβ + F(α∗)α
.
So G(e(α,[0,α ∗])) = 1

























y − k(s(α) − α)





And α∗ = α3 (k) has to satisfy π1 ([0,α ∗])
£




1+π2 (α∗)δy − k(s(α∗) − α∗)
2
i
Exactly as above one can prove the existence and uniqueness of α3 (k) and
of k2 such that the strategies are an equilibrium iﬀ k ≥ k2.
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